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Policy Summary 
The likelihood for Xylella fastidiosa to be introduced to novel locations such as Scotland is increasing 
mainly due to an increase in global trade. Outbreaks in southern Europe has been devastating, especially 
in Puglia, Italy, where millions of olive trees have been infected and died. This economically important 
plant pathogen could have a significant impact on Scottish agricultural and horticultural trades and 
therefore understanding the potential spread of X. fastidiosa in Scotland is important for informing 
contingency planning. 
In this report we build upon existing X. fastidiosa spread stochastic simulation models based on those 
used to investigate Xylella outbreaks in Italy, making assumptions about how the underlying epidemiology 
might change should the disease be introduced. Using this model, we investigate numerous theoretical 
surveillance strategies to determine the best strategy given Scotland’s unique topology. It should be noted 
that the work presented here is the first time that we have applied the Italian Xylella model in the UK, and 
the work undertaken in this study is a precursor to that being done in the UK-wide BRIGIT project 
(https://www.jic.ac.uk/brigit/), which will build on this study. 
The modelling, albeit with considerable scope for refined parameterisation to the Scottish context, shows 
that the best surveillance strategies are highly dependent on the whether the introduction of the infected 
plant is near to a nursery or other location that is deemed to be a likely source for introduction. In the 
event that the introduction of an infected plant is close to a location that has been determined to be a 
potential risk, then a concentrated risk-based surveillance with low-level national surveillance elsewhere 
is predicted to be the best strategy. By contrast, if the introduction is not near to a location that has been 
determined to be a potential risk (e.g. due to dispersal via plant sales; or other modes of introduction) 
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then a national surveillance strategy is predicted to work best in most cases. Risk-based surveillance was 
predicted to work well in some scenarios. This may be because the location of nurseries are located close 
to urban or woodland cover, which therefore suggests that risk-based surveillance will cover areas of a 
likely introduction, especially is the risk-based surveillance is sufficiently wide. However, we conclude that 
having a mixture of risk-based and national surveillance is likely to be the best option for detecting 
potential X. fastidiosa outbreaks in Scotland.   
Since the Scottish environment is much cooler than the current southern European outbreak locations, it 
is likely that the bacteria will have a slower within-host growth rate, which is likely to slow the rate of 
host-to-host spread. Under these circumstances, the spread model indicates that detection of an outbreak 
will be more difficult. Therefore, surveillance strategies should take this into account.  
We highlight that improved contingency planning could be achieved by further studies on host and vector 
distribution and densities, better understanding of how X. fastidiosa might proliferate in hosts in a Scottish 
environment, and a detailed assessment of how and where X. fastidiosa could potentially be introduced. 
